Alongside the RONA was the Russkaya Natsionalnaya Narodnaya
Armiya (RNNA – Russian Nationalist National Army) led by a “White” Russian
émigré called S. N. Ivanov. The unit was formed at Ossintorf near the
Orsha-Smolensk rail line. It was organized along Russian lines, being equipped
entirely with captured Soviet arms. Its personnel wore Red Army uniforms with
tsarist-type white, blue and red cockades. The unit’s Russian members, along
with many other Russian units in German service, wrongly assumed that they were
the nucleus of a future great Russian “liberation” army. They therefore decided
(without prior German approval) to name their embryonic formation the RNNA. By
the end of 1942, the formation numbered 7000 men organized into four infantry
battalions, an artillery battalion and an engineer battalion. Recruits came
mainly from POW camps, the volunteers joining to escape starvation. Some
émigrés also decided to join the RNNA, including Lieutenant V. Ressler,
Lieutenant Count G. Lamsdorff and Lieutenant Count S. von der Pahlen.
The formation’s first major engagement took place in May
1942, in the Yelnia area east of Smolensk. Some 300 RNNA men were assigned the
task of probing the positions of the encircled Soviet Thirty-Third Army, an
operation that took several weeks. By December 1942, the RNNA was approximately
the size of a German brigade and was a well-trained formation. Feldmarschall
Hans von Kluge, commander of Army Group Centre, having personally inspected the
unit, was impressed by what he saw but issued an order that stipulated that the
formation be divided into individual battalions and assigned to separate German
units. These actions were in line with Hitler’s order to keep all the units of
Russian nationals no larger than battalion size.
The RNNA almost mutinied in protest, since the order
destroyed any idea that they were an embryonic Russian army of liberation. The
matter was resolved when several RNNA officers were promoted and the formation
was not broken up (though neither was it sent to the front). However, the
damage had been done and the RNNA soldiers no longer trusted the Germans. Those
who remained were later incorporated into the ROA formation.
In parallel to the RNNA were the so-called Eastern Legions
(Ostlegionen). In late 1941, Hitler was visited by General Erkilet of the
Turkish General Staff, who urged the Führer to intervene on behalf of Red Army
POWs of Turkic nationality. Hitler, eager to recruit Turkey as an ally, granted
permission in November for the creation of a Turkistani legion. The experiment
was such a success that by the end of the year three more Eastern Legions had
been formed, the Caucasian Moslem Legion (later split into the North Caucasian
Legion and the Azerbaijani Legion), Georgian Legion and Armenian Legion. In
addition, by mid-1942, the Crimean Tartar and Volga Tartar Legions had been
raised. Hitler, wary of this rapid growth, stipulated that the legions be
organized into units no larger than a battalion and then widely dispersed among
German Army formations to prevent them being a security hazard. An exception,
as a gesture to court the Turks, was the formation of the Turkistani 162nd
(Turkish) Infantry Division in May 1943 to serve as the parent unit for the
various legion battalions.
The most interesting legion was the Sonderverband Bermann,
formed by Abwehr chief Admiral Canaris and composed of Georgians, Armenians,
Azerbaijanis and other Caucasian POWs. The plan was to parachute the unit
behind Soviet lines to act as a “fifth column”. Nothing came of the idea,
though, and its two battalions ended up fighting at the front.
In August 1942, General Ernst Köstring was made Inspector
General of Turkic and Caucasian Forces; by September 1944, he had thousands of
legion members under his command. In the legions and replacement battalions
were 11,600 Armenians, 13,000 Azerbaijanis, 14,000 Georgians and 10,000 North
Caucasians. These nationalities formed a further 21,595 men in pioneer and
transport units, 25,000 in German Army battalions and 7000 in Luftwaffe and
Waffen-SS formations. This gave a total of 102,195 men.
The legion movement was a success in that large numbers of
recruits were raised, which freed up regular German units to undertake combat
duties. However, when it came to frontline combat duties they were less useful.
Often poorly armed, trained and motivated (especially when they were located
away from their region of origin), they were unreliable and next to useless.
For example, the 797th Georgian Battalion simply refused to fight when ordered
to do so.
No study of Russian units in German service would be
complete without mention of the Cossacks. Contrary to popular legend, and
despite anti-communist sentiments nourished by many Cossacks and the
cracking-down on many aspects of Cossack traditions by the communist regime,
the overwhelming majority of Cossacks remained loyal to the Soviet Government.
That said, substantial numbers of Cossacks did fight for the Germans in World
War II.
On 22 August 1941, while covering the retreat of Red Army
units in eastern Belarus, a Don Cossack major in the Red Army named Kononov (a
graduate of Frunze Military Academy, veteran of the Winter War against Finland,
a Communist Party member since 1927 and holder of the Order of the Red Banner)
deserted and went over to the Germans with his entire regiment (the 436th
Infantry Regiment of the 155th Soviet Infantry Division), after convincing his
regiment of the necessity of overthrowing Stalinism (among the few incidences
of a whole Soviet regiment going over to the Axis during World War II). He was
permitted by local German commanders to establish a squadron of Cossack
troopers composed of deserters and volunteers from among POWs, to be used for
frontline raiding and reconnaissance missions. With encouragement from his new
superior, General Schenkendorff, eight days after his defection Kononov visited
a POW camp in Mogilev in eastern Belarus. The visit yielded more than 4000
volunteers in response to the promise of liberation from Stalin’s oppression with
the aid of their German “allies”. However, only 500 of them (80 percent of whom
were Cossacks) were actually drafted into the renegade formation. Afterwards,
Kononov paid similar visits to POW camps in Bobruisk, Orsha, Smolensk, Propoisk
and Gomel with similar results. The Germans appointed a Wehrmacht lieutenant
named Count Rittberg to be the unit’s liaison officer, in which capacity he
served for the remainder of the war.
By 19 September 1941, the Cossack regiment contained 77
officers and 1799 men (of whom 60 percent were Cossacks, mostly Don Cossacks).
It received the designation 120th Don Cossack Regiment; and, on 27 January
1943, it was renamed the 600th Don Cossack Battalion, despite the fact that its
numerical strength stood at about 2000 and it was scheduled to receive a
further 1000 new members the following month. The new volunteers were employed
in the establishment of a new special Cossack armoured unit that became known
as the 17th Cossack Armoured Battalion, which after its formation was integrated
into the German Third Army and was frequently employed in frontline operations.
Kononov’s Cossack unit displayed a very anti-communist
character. During raids behind Soviet lines, for example, it concentrated on
the extermination of Stalinist commissars and the collection of their tongues
as “war trophies”. On one occasion, in the vicinity of Velikyie Luki in
northwestern Russia, 120 of Kononov’s infiltrators dressed in Red Army uniforms
managed to penetrate Soviet lines. They subsequently captured an entire
military tribunal of five judges accompanied by 21 guards, and freed 41 soldiers
who were about to be executed. They also seized valuable documents in the
process.
Kononov’s unit also carried out a propaganda campaign by
spreading pamphlets on and behind the frontline and using loudspeakers to get
their message to Red Army soldiers, officers and civilians. Unfortunately for
Kononov, the behaviour of the Germans in the occupied territories worked
against his campaign. But Kononov’s Cossacks continued to serve their German
“liberators” loyally, and were particularly active with Army Group South during
the second half of 1942.
Aside from Kononov’s unit, in April 1942, Hitler gave his
official consent for the establishment of Cossack units within the Wehrmacht,
and subsequently a number of such units were soon in existence. In October 1942,
General Wagner permitted the creation, under strict German control, of a small
autonomous Cossack district in the Kuban, where the old Cossack customs were to
be reintroduced and collective farms disbanded (a rather cynical propaganda
ploy to win over the hearts and souls of the region’s Cossack population). All
Cossack military formations serving in the Wehrmacht were under tight control;
the majority of officers in such units were not Cossacks but Germans who had no
sympathy towards Cossack aspirations for self-government and freedom.
The 1942 German offensive in southern Russia yielded more
Cossack recruits. In late 1942, Cossacks of a single stanitsa (Cossack
settlement) in southern Russia revolted against the Soviet administration and
joined the advancing Axis forces. As the latter moved forward, Cossack
fugitives and rebellious mountain tribesmen of the Caucasus openly welcomed the
intruders as liberators. On the lower Don River, a renegade Don Cossack leader
named Sergei Pavlov proclaimed himself an ataman (Cossack chief) and took up
residence in the former home of the tsarist ataman in the town of Novoczerkassk
on the lower Don. He then set about establishing a local collaborationist
police force composed of either Don Cossacks or men of Cossack descent. By late
1942, he headed a regional krug (Cossack assembly) which had around 200
representatives, whom he recruited from the more prominent local collaborators.
He also requested permission from the Germans to create a Cossack army to be
employed in the struggle against the Bolsheviks, a request that was refused.
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